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ABSTRACT 
The construction of nuclear power plants is a major step towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
compared to the conventional coal-fired or oil-fired power plants. However, some of the major nuclear 
accidents in the past have raised questions about the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. This paper 
compares and contrasts the major nuclear accidents of the past for example, the Chernobyl disaster (USSR), 
the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (Japan), and the Three Mile Island incident (USA). Although each of the 
accidents was unique, a thorough comparison found some common issues, such as faulty design of reactors 
and safety systems, safety rules violations, and lack of trained operators.  
The primary impacts mostly involved radiation hazards such as exposure to varying doses of radiation, 
uninhabitable neighborhoods and health problems; the levels of impact varied mostly due to different 
intensities of warnings and precautionary measures taken by the local governments. The research findings 
would serve as an important resource for the nuclear professionals to plan proper precautionary measures in 
order to avoid the major issues that initiated or resulted from the accidents in the past. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power plants are one of the most complex 
and sophisticated energy systems designed to 
produce low carbon electrical energy in contrast to 
the conventional (e.g., lignite-, coal-, and oil-
based) power plants. Table 1 provides a 
comparative summary of the amount of 
greenhouse gas emitted in the lifecycle of the 
nuclear plants and the other conventional plants as 
published by the World Nuclear Association (WNA 
[World Nuclear Association, 2011]). A World Health 
Organization (WHO) study has estimated that 
greenhouse gases generated from conventional 
power plants since 1990 caused an extra 150,000 
deaths in 2000, which are mostly attributable to the 
global warming–related climate change combined 
with malnutrition, diarrhea, cardiovascular 
diseases, and premature deaths due to air 
pollution (Markandya & Wilkinson, 2007). 
However, the recent nuclear accident in 
Fukushima Daiichi, Japan, in 2011 was a wakeup 
call to the entire nuclear industry, and questions 
were raised about the social benefits and costs 
associated with nuclear power (Aoki & Rothwell, 
2013). 
This research evaluated the five major nuclear power 
plant accidents as case studies and compared and 
contrasted the major causes and related 
consequences behind those accidents. This paper 
summarizes the important lessons learned from 
the past instances which could serve as an 
information tool for the nuclear professionals to 
plan for proper preventive measures well in 
advance to avoid similar accidents in future. 
2. RANKING SYSTEM 
Nuclear accidents are ranked based on severity 
using a logarithmic scale called the International 
Table 1. Intensity of lifecycle greenhouse gas emission by the 
different energy facilities Source: World Nuclear Association 
[WNA], 2011 
Generation facilities
Mean Low High  
(Technologies)      
   
 Tonnes CO2e/Giga-Watt-Hour  
      
Lignite 1054 790 1372
 
     
Coal 888 756 1310
 
     
Oil 733 547 935
 
     
Natural gas 499 362 891
 
     
Solar PV 85 13 731
 
     
Biomass 45 10 101
 
     
Nuclear 29 2 130
 
     
Hydroelectric 26 2 237
 
     
Wind 26 6 124
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Figure 1. International nuclear and radiological event scale. 
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2013 
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) 
developed by the International Atomic Agency in 
1990. The scale ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 
represents least severe and 7 represents most 
severe. The ranking is interpreted as follows: “a 
nuclear event rated 4 in the scale is ten times worse 
than that rated at 3” (IAEA, 2013). Figure 1 is a 
pictorial representation of the INES Scale. 
3. MAJOR ACCIDENT BACKGROUNDS 
A nuclear power plant is a highly complex system, 
and any type of minor malfunction of a single 
component, operator error, or even a minor design 
fault, can cause a catastrophic disaster which may 
not only have short-term effects but also severe 
long-term effects due to harmful nuclear radiation. 
Each of the nuclear accidents was unique and, 
thus, needs to be analyzed independently to reveal 
the major causes behind their occurrence. The 
related consequences and the mitigation strategies 
that were adopted in each case based on the 
scenario details are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
3.1. Chernobyl, USSR, 1986; INES Rank 7 
The Chernobyl disaster that occurred in the city of 
Pripyat, in the USSR on April 25, 1986, is ranked as 
the most severe accident by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as it involved not 
only heat transients but also reactivity transients, 
that is, it released radioactive elements (fission 
products) in the biosphere in major proportions. It 
not only killed onsite personnel but also the 
contamination traveled far and wide to affect the 
surrounding environment and caused immense 
health impacts for the people living in the region. 
The accident, which is referred to as one of the 
worst disasters in the history of the nuclear industry, 
resulted from a series of design weaknesses in the 
reactor that turned into a deadly disaster due to a 
series of operator errors and safety violations during 
a botched experiment. The accident occurred while 
performing a risky experiment of testing if the 
residual energy from the torque of a turbine could 
run a turbine generator while the turbines were 
coasting down in the event of a loss of electric 
power (a station “blackout”). It was necessary to 
keep the cooling pumps working in the brief gap 
(about 100 seconds) of the power outage and the 
running of the generators. The experiment was 
performed by turning off many safety signals and 
safety valves. Huge amounts of radioactivity in the 
order of 7x106 curies was released, killing 31 onsite 
operators (Malinauskas, 1987) followed by the 
death of 7,000–10,000 liquidators who helped in 
cleaning the site (Dickman, 1991); contaminating 
air, soil, vegetation and cattle; causing thyroid 
cancer in children; and impacting the general health 
of the inhabitants settled in the surrounding areas 
(30 kilometers in radius [Peplow, 2011; Norman, 
1986; Rich, 1989; Balter, 1996; Kazakov, 
Demidchik, Astakhova, &Baverstock, 1992]). 
3.2. Fukushima Daiichi, Japan, 2011; INES Rank 7 
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
disaster is considered the worst disaster after 
Chernobyl in the history of nuclear power plants. 
This event took place after the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (magnitude 9.0 on the Richter Scale), 
which occurred off the Sanriku coast of Japan on 
March 11, 2011 (Robertson & Pengilley, 2012). The 
earthquake generated a series of tsunamis along 
the coast of Japan, which negatively affected 
several nuclear plants situated in the coastal area. 
However, Fukushima Daiichi was the worst, and its 
subsequent problems resulted in a state of nuclear 
emergency in Japan. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant is one of the 15 largest power plants in 
the world. It consisted of six boiling water reactors 
(BWRs) designed by General Electric (GE) and 
maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO) and generated a combined power of 4.7 
gigawatts (Dauer, Zanzonico, Tuttle, Quinn, & 
Strauss, 2011). The accident was caused due to a 
series of equipment failures, violation of safety 
regulations, and faulty design of the plant layout 
along with underestimation of the “design-basis 
tsunami height” parameter used in design 
considerations of the plant. The Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear plant was designed initially based on the 
assumption that the maximum estimated height of a 
tsunami could be 3.1 meters above the mean sea 
level although TEPCO used a revised design basis 
tsunami height of 5.7 meters. However, in 2011, the 
estimated height of the tsunami waves was 15 
165 
meters, on average, just before it caused the 
landfall (Acton & Hibbs, 2012). All these factors led 
to consecutive nuclear meltdowns resulting in the 
release of radioactivity into the environment. The 
accident was ranked 7 by the INES, on a scale of 1 
to 7, and is considered to be the second worst 
nuclear accident in the history of nuclear power 
plants since 1952 (IAEA, 2013). Radioactive plumes 
spread erratically due to the wind, contaminating 
the sea water and soil (Yamaguchi, 2011; Mathieu, 
et al., 2012; Testing the waters for radionuclides 
(Nuclear Energy, n.d.), affecting the livestock 
industry (Tsuiki & Maeda, 2012), and infecting the 
human and cattle in the surrounding regions 
causing rapid depopulation and community 
breakups (Ishikawa, Kanazawa, Morimoto, & 
Takahashi, 2012). 
3.3. Chalk River Incident, Canada, 1952; INES  
Rank 5 
The Chalk River Laboratories located on the bank 
of the Chalk River, Ontario, Canada, is a huge 
facility that was developed by a joint collaboration 
between Canada, the United States, and Great 
Britain. Besides conducting several atomic bomb 
projects during World War II, Canada’s National 
Research Council (NRC) felt the need to expand 
commercial power production from nuclear energy 
and started to operate an experimental reactor 
called NRX beginning in 1947 (The NRX Incident). 
On December 12, 1952, an accident occurred due 
to human flaws, operating errors, and 
miscommunication among the supervisor and 
operating personnel. Due to the accident, the NRX 
nuclear reactor was completely destroyed, and a 
series of steam and hydrogen gas explosions 
spewed thousands of fission particles into the air 
(Chalk River Nuclear Accident, n.d.). Although, 
this accident did not cause any injury to workers 
or widespread environmental contamination, it 
completely destroyed the nuclear reactor core. 
The reactor core could not be decontaminated 
and had to be buried as nuclear waste (Chalk 
River Nuclear Accident, n.d.). It was ranked 5 by 
the INES in terms of its severity. It was followed 
by a second accident 6 year later in 1958 when 
the overheated uranium metal fuel rods broke 
inside the reactor core (Chalk River Nuclear 
Accident, n.d.). The accident was managed 
efficiently and the impact of radiation 
contamination was minimized (Cross, 1980; Chalk 
River nuclear accident, n.d.). 
3.4. TMI (Three Mile Island), US, 1979; INES  
Rank 5 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident, 
March 28, 1979, was the worst nuclear accident in 
the United States commercial nuclear industry. 
Although it involved release of small amounts of 
radioactive gases, it destroyed the reactor as it 
had undergone partial meltdown due to a loss-of-
coolant –accident (LOCA). The accident that 
occurred in the TMI nuclear power plant was a 
combined effect of a series of mechanical failures, 
lack of proper training of the operators, human 
errors, and misunderstanding of the system by the 
operators (human computer interface). In addition, 
design flaws related to indicators and warning 
systems resulted in minor mechanical failures in 
the secondary cooling system of the reactor, 
which lead to a more severe nuclear incident 
(Mynatt, 1982; WNA, 2001). A total release of 
radioactivity in the range of 2.4 million to 13 
million curies was recorded, although much less 
(around 13 to 17 curies) was released into the 
environment (Mynatt, 1982). Thus, the health 
impact of the accident on the public was mostly 
psychological rather than a result of exposure to 
radiation. (Lavelle, 1999; Pool, 1991; Hatch, 
Wallenstein, Beyea, Nieves, & Susser, 1991; 
Goldhaber, Staub, & Tokuhata, 1983). 
3.5. SL-1 (Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number 
1), US, 1961; INES Rank 4  
The Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number One 
(SL-1) was an experimental power reactor located 
40 miles west of Idaho Falls, Idaho, and was 
operated by the U.S. Army. Its main purpose was 
to provide electrical power to remote military 
facilities in the area (U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, 1961). On January 3, 1961, during 
routine maintenance, the central control rod was 
removed too far causing the reactor to suffer a 
prompt criticality1 accident, resulting in a steam 
explosion and deaths of all the three operators on 
site. The INES rating of 4 was determined based 
on the fact that soil and air samples indicated 
traces of contamination. However, the reactor 
building was highly effective at enclosing the 
radioactive materials dispersed from the steam 
explosion (Horan & Gammill, 1963). Except for the 
three fatalities, there was not much health and 
environmental impact as around 99.99% of the 
total fission products from the reactor were 
retained inside the reactor building (Adams, 
1996). 
Table 2 provides a comparative analysis of the 
major causes and issues, identified through the 
extensive literature review across the five major 
accidents. 
 
                                                            
1 An assembly is referred to as prompt critical if for each nuclear 
fission event, one or more of the immediate or prompt neutrons 
released causes an additional fission event which causes a rapid 
exponential increase in the number of fission events 
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Table 2. Comparative analysis of the major issues 
Issues Chernobyl FDNPP Chalk- TMI SL-1  river        
 
        
Faulty Design  x x  x  
 
        
Equipment     x   Failure              
        
Inadequate       
 
Safety & Warning    x  
 
Systems       
 
        
Violation of       
 
Safety  x x x x x
 
Regulations       
 
       
Lack of Trained x  x    Professionals            
 
       
Operators’ error x x x x x
 
        
 
4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE 
STUDIES 
A thorough literature review of the past nuclear 
power plant accidents revealed a series of issues 
that need to be addressed so that the probability of 
future accidents is significantly lowered. This paper 
categorizes the lessons learned from three 
perspectives: 
 
• Safety  
• Training  
• Response and mitigation strategies  
4.1. Safety 
Sophisticated and more accurate weather 
forecasting warning systems are necessary in order 
to get prepared for the upcoming disaster. After the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster, 
the Japan government proposed to install a system 
of ocean-bottom sensors costing around US $402 
million so that it can provide more accurate 
warnings of tsunamis heading towards the coast 
(Malinauskas, 1987).  
Whether a nuclear power plant is in an operating 
state or undergoing a shutdown phase, safety 
regulations proposed by the respective nuclear 
regulatory commission to which the plants are 
affiliated should be strictly followed (WNA, 2013). 
For example, one of the major reasons behind the 
TMI accident was the violation of the safety 
regulations as proposed by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). According to NRC 
regulations, if the auxiliary feed water pumps are 
out of service for 72 hours or more, the nuclear 
power plant's reactor must be shut down. However, 
the operators of the TMI nuclear power plant did not 
shut down the reactor core even when the valves 
on the reactor's auxiliary feed water pump system 
were closed for maintenance for 2 weeks before the 
accident 
4.2. Training 
Proper training of the all the operating personnel 
working in a nuclear plant is necessary because a 
small mistake due to ignorance on part of the 
operators, in terms of lack of knowledge or violation 
of safety regulations, can sometimes lead to a 
major accident. A comparative analysis of the major 
causes (Table 2) revealed that operator’s error is 
the most common cause behind each of the 
accidents. For example, in the case of the Chalk 
River incident, due to a lack of profound knowledge 
about the nuclear reactor operating switches, the 
operator blindly followed the supervisor’s wrong 
instructions (Chalk River Nuclear Accident, n.d.). 
The SL-1 accident was initiated when the operator 
manually removed the control rod by 50 centimeters 
instead of 10 centimeters which was required to 
reconnect the central control rod to the drive 
mechanism after 11 days of a routine shutdown. 
This might have also happened due to the 
ignorance of the operator or his lack of knowledge 
about the fact that even a lift of 40 centimeters of 
the control rods would be enough to make the 
reactor critical (Adams, 1996).  
Health physicians working in the hospitals that are 
included in the emergency plans of the nuclear 
power plants should be specially trained to manage 
these emergency situations in case of an accident 
and offer immediate care to the people exposed to 
radiation hazards.  
4.3. Response and Mitigation Strategies 
Efficient response and mitigation strategies require 
good communication between the public and the 
government after a nuclear disaster, presence of 
adequate contingency plans with respect to efficient 
transportation from the affected site to the hospitals, 
and the availability of health counseling to reduce 
the psychological impact of the radiation hazards on 
the public. Moreover government and nuclear 
agencies should work collaboratively to develop an 
efficient debris-removal strategy; in most of the 
cases, after the nuclear accidents, the affected sites 
are exposed to high doses of radiation exposure 
that adversely affect the health of the liquidators 
responsible for cleaning the affected site. 
4.3.1. Efficient Communication and Coordination 
After a nuclear disaster, the government should 
clearly communicate the severity of the disaster and 
the related health impacts for both in the cases of 
high radiation and low radiation exposure (Nature, 
2011; Peplow, 2011). This was done very efficiently 
in the case of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear accident 
but not at all in the case of Chernobyl accident, 
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when children were even allowed play outside after 
the accident happened (Peplow, 2011).  
An efficient area-wide telecommunication system 
surrounding a nuclear power plant is important to 
keep the power plant, hospitals, and other local 
emergency management agencies in a well-
integrated network (Maxwell, 1982).  
A postmortem analysis of the TMI nuclear accident 
suggested that the evacuation planning and 
disaster response strategies should account for the 
medical emergencies, and, thus, efficient 
communication between nuclear engineers and 
health physicians should be fostered (Maxwell, 
1982). A lack of such mitigation strategies led to 
severe disorganization and mismanagement in the 
neighboring health care agencies of the TMI nuclear 
power plant.  
4.3.2. Requirements for Efficient Response and 
Recovery Processes  
Adequate contingency plans should be prepared by 
the hospitals in regards to hospital staffing, as well 
as transfer of bed-ridden patients from the affected 
area to another hospital in a safer area in case of 
an emergency situation. Lack of such plans led to 
several organizational problems in the neighboring 
hospitals and health care institutions surrounding 
the TMI nuclear power plant after the accident 
(Maxwell, 1982).  
The after-accident crises in the TMI incident also 
suggested that transportation facilities should be 
readily available to the hospitals and the other 
health care facilities so that, in case of an 
emergency, immediate evacuation is possible 
(Maxwell, 1982).  
The sale of milk and food products should be strictly 
prohibited in the contaminated areas to prevent the 
spread of radioactivity as the radioactive elements 
iodine-131 and cesium-137 are highly absorbed by 
milk and vegetables, respectively. In the Chernobyl 
disaster, the government did not take any action 
regarding restricting sales, but after the Fukushima 
Daiichi disaster, the Japanese government (likely 
taking a lesson from Chernobyl) strictly stopped the 
sale of milk and food products in the surrounding 
regions of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant 
(Fukuda, et al., 2013; Tsuiki & Maeda, 2012). 
Funding is essential for the recovery process. 
However, it is extremely hard to maintain the flow of 
funds after nuclear disasters occur because of 
inadequate public relations information (Nature, 
2011).  
Efficient rescue planning needs to be done in 
regards to sending the rescue team to the radiation-
affected area. This was a lesson learned from the 
Chalk River and the SL-1 accidents which are 
looked upon as great examples where well-planned 
and efficient response strategies were adopted such 
that radiation contamination did not have severe 
after effects.  
4.3.3. Efficient Health Recovery of Public 
Health counseling offered through several 
workshops, campaigns, and seminars to the public 
sometimes help in reducing the huge psychological 
impact and posttraumatic stress on the people. 
(Peplow, 2011; Kamada, Saito, Endo, Kimura, & 
Shizuma, 2012; BBC, 2011). For example, after the 
TMI nuclear accident, a TMI Public Health and 
Information Series on cancer, radiation, and 
epidemiology was conducted in the nearby 
universities to provide more information on the 
health effects due to a nuclear disaster so that the 
people could educate themselves about the 
radiation consequences and relieve themselves 
from the existing stress and trauma of the disaster.  
Special attention should be given to small children 
and pregnant mothers as they are more likely to be 
affected by the radioactive iodine-131, as this 
element is easily absorbed by the thyroid glands of 
children and can later in life possibly cause thyroid 
cancer. The USSR government failed to take such 
precautions after the Chernobyl disaster which 
resulted in an increased number of thyroid cancer 
patients, most of whom were children (Balter, 1996; 
Kazakov et al., 1992).  
Systematic distribution of prophylactic potassium 
iodide (a thyroid blocking agent) to the public and 
also the nearby health care agencies is essential 
(Balter, 1996; Maxwell, 1982). 
4.3.4. Efficient Evacuation Planning 
Immediate evacuation orders should be 
implemented by the government so that, even if 
there is a spread of radioactivity in the surrounding 
areas of the nuclear plant, the inhabitants do not 
have to encounter a prolonged exposure to 
radioactivity. The Japanese government did the 
evacuation planning very efficiently after the nuclear 
disaster, whereas in the case of Chernobyl disaster, 
evacuation orders were given 10 days after the 
accident to the people in the surrounding areas 
(areas beyond 3 kilometers in radius from the 
nuclear plant) (Peplow, 2011; Malinauskas, 1987; 
BBC, 2011; Yamaguchi, 2011). 
5. CONCLUSION 
This research study considered five major nuclear 
power plant accidents based on the severity ranking 
by INES as case studies and analyzes the causes 
and issues behind those accidents, the 
consequences of the accidents, and the related 
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mitigation strategies adopted in each case to 
provide a concrete background for the lessons 
learned from the history. This paper provides a brief 
overview of each of the accidents and a 
comparative analysis of the causes across the five 
incidents. The outcome of this research is a series 
of lessons learned from the past instances that 
could serve as an important information tool for 
nuclear professionals to plan adequate safety and 
response strategies which would reduce the 
probability of a disaster taking place and reduce the 
impact of a disaster in case it occurs. 
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